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Abstract—Wi-Fi signals-based person identification attracts
increasing attention in the booming Internet-of-Things era mainly
due to its pervasiveness and passiveness. Most previous work
applies gaits extracted from WiFi distortions caused by person
walking to achieve the identification. However, to extract useful
gait, a person must walk along a pre-defined path for several
meters, which requires user high collaboration and increases
identification time overhead, thus limiting use scenarios. More-
over, gait based work has severe shortcoming in identification
performance, especially when the user volume is large. In order
to eliminate above limitations, in this paper, we present an
operation-free person identification system, namely WiPIN, that
requires least user collaboration and achieves good performance.
WiPIN is based on an entirely new insight that Wi-Fi signals
would carry person body information when propagating through
the body, which is potentially discriminated for person identifica-
tion. Then we demonstrate the feasibility on commodity off-the-
shelf Wi-Fi devices by well-designed signal pre-processing, feature
extraction, and identity matching algorithms. Results show that
WiPIN achieves 92% identification accuracy over 30 users, high
robustness to various experimental settings, and low identifying
time overhead, i.e., less than 300ms.
Index Terms—Wi-Fi, Person identification, Operation-free
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, channel state information (CSI) of Wi-Fi signals
has been increasingly exploited for person identification [1]–
[7] due to the pervasiveness and low cost in deployment.
Besides, Wi-Fi based person identification enables passive
identification, i.e., high user-friendly. What’s more important,
unlike popular face recognition systems being vulnerable to
the replay attacks [8], or fingerprint recognition struggling for
spoofing attacks from 3D printed models [9], it is harder to
fool the Wi-Fi based person identification system because the
attack needs extremely vivid imitation on user behaviors.
Among previous work, CSI monitoring during user am-
bulation are the most prevailing CSI-based identification ap-
proaches [1]–[4], [6], [7], which demand users to walk along
pre-defined paths and record corresponding Wi-Fi CSI series
simultaneously. Then the recorded CSI is either to extract
specific gait metric such as walking speed for identification [4],
or directly to learn identity classifiers with machine learning
algorithms, e.g., support vector machine [1]–[3], [6] or deep
neural networks [7]. However, to recognize a person’s gait,
one must walk along the pre-defined paths again for several
meters, e.g., 2-3m in [2] and 5m in [1], which is labor intensive
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Fig. 1. WiPIN rationale. When one stands in a Wi-Fi environment (left),
multi-path effect on the person body would lead to discriminated distortions
in the Wi-Fi amplitude (right), which carries body information and can be
well-designed for person identification.
and time-consuming, thus largely limits use scenarios. To
overcome limitations in gait-based approaches, Shi et al. [5]
propose an activity-based person identification, which is built
on the finding that CSI series corresponding to user daily activ-
ities like opening micro-oven carries identity-related patterns.
Though the approach in [5] requires less labor work, daily
activity patterns are inferior in robustness compared to gait.
Previous work utilizes Wi-Fi distortions caused by user be-
haviors, such as walking and other daily activities embedding
behavior patterns, to identify users. Moreover, we find that not
only user behaviors, the presence of user can result in identity-
related Wi-Fi distortions due to unique body information, e.g.,
body shape, body fat rate, and body muscle rate, which can
also be used to identify users (see Section II for the study).
With the above observation, we propose an operation-free
passive person identification system, namely WiPIN. It can
deeply extracts human body information from Wi-Fi distortion
series caused by the user’s presence, hence further identifies
people with well-designed signal pre-processing and identity
matching algorithms. One challenge in realizing the system
is the mixture of body relevant signal and interference sig-
nals from multiple Wi-Fi propagation paths, and we tackle
this problem by implementing a multi-path effect mitigation.
Experimental results show that WiPIN achieves 92% identi-
fication accuracy over 30 subjects with robustness to various
experimental settings and low identifying time overhead, i.e.,
less than 300 ms. We summarize the main contributions of
this paper as follows.
• We propose WiPIN, a novel Wi-Fi signals-based passive
person identification system, which has no requirement
for the proactive user engagement in traditional iden-
tification systems, such as facing camera and scanning
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Fig. 2. System framework. WiPIN is comprised of hardware and algorithms. The algorithms contain modules of signal pre-processing, data preparation, and
identity matching. After deployment, WiPIN can identify legal users while reject illegal users.
finger/iris. In addition, WiPIN is user-friendly and time-
efficient in practice.
• We quantitatively study the rationale behind WiPIN,
and conclude that during propagation, Wi-Fi signals are
embedded with information related to human body. The
intrinsic body information further used for person iden-
tification is robuster than behavior patterns.
• WiPIN can classify authenticated users, as well as to
reject illegal users that not seen before. We prototype
WiPIN using commodity off-the-shelf Wi-Fi devices, and
conduct extensive experiments to validate advances of
WiPIN in various aspects including accuracy, robustness,
time consumption, etc.
II. RATIONALE STUDY
Past work uses Wi-Fi distortions that embedded user be-
haviors patterns for person identification. Moreover, We are
wondering how CSI varies if a person does no operation
just standing in a Wi-Fi environment. Fig. 1 illustrates our
preliminary experiment results for this wondering. We re-
cruited 10 subjects to stand in a same position, respectively,
near the Wi-Fi transmitter and receiver (left), meanwhile the
corresponding CSI series are recorded. We average the CSI
amplitudes over all recorded samples and plot them in the
Fig. 1 (right). Majority of the amplitudes are discriminated,
which demonstrates the potentiality for person identification.
We ascribe the reason of results shown in Fig. 1 to that
during the propagation, Wi-Fi signals must be embedded with
certain information related to human body such as body shape,
body fat rate, and body muscle rate, because of the multi-path
effect on the body, and the absorption and reflection effect in
the body. If this guess is correct, it is possible to perform
person identification using Wi-Fi signals without any user
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Fig. 3. Information related to human body such as the fat rate and the muscle
rate is embedded in the Wi-Fi distortion and can be well predicted by Wi-Fi
signals with support vector regression [10].
activities like walking for several meters, but only standing
for a second. To further confirm the guess, we measure the
body fat rate and muscle rate of these subjects by a Mir
body fat scale, then train a mapping function from CSI to
aforesaid rates with support vector regression (SVR) [10] (our
not inferring body shape is because it is hard to get the ground-
truth of body shape). Fig. 3 demonstrates that CSI distortions
caused by standing persons are highly relevant with body fat
rate and body muscle rate.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
WiPIN can identify authenticated users while reject illegal
users. Fig. 2 illustrates WiPIN framework that is comprised of
CSI generation hardware and person identification algorithms.
In hardware-end, the transmitter (Tx) broadcasts Wi-Fi signals,
and the receiver (Rx) records the signals. Using a Linux
802.11n CSI tool [11], we can parse CSI of 30 orthogonal
frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) subcarriers at 5GHz
central frequency from the recorded signals. Formally, denote
CSI as H and suppose we record t Wi-Fi samples, then
H ∈ Ct×30, where C is for the Complex value, which is time-
serial data essentially. In this paper, we only use the amplitudes
of CSI, leading to H ∈ Rt×30 (R for the Real value). Next
we go details in the algorithm-end of WiPIN.
A. Signal Processing
1) Noise Removal: Due to the hardware imperfection [12],
the sampled CSI series, i.e., H , have considerable noise. As
an example in Fig. 4, we plot CSI series recorded within 1
second when a subject stands as shown in Fig. 2. In the figure,
each line stands for the amplitude series of one subcarrier
(30 lines in all). To eliminate the high-frequency jitters, we
design a low-pass Butterworth filter [13]. In particular, we
experimentally set the parameter of the Butterworth filter
as 5th-order with cut-off frequency of 10Hz. The filtering
results are illustrated in Fig. 4 (b), which demonstrate that the
Butterworth filter with above settings can significantly reduce
noises in the CSI series.
2) Multi-path Effect Mitigation: WiPIN uses omnidirec-
tional antennas to broadcast and receive Wi-Fi signals, which
makes CSI the mixture of signals from multiple propagation
paths, including the line-of-sight path, the paths reflected from
human body, and other reflection paths. This phenomenon is
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(b) Filtered CSI.
Fig. 4. Noise removal via Butterworth filter.
called multi-path effect [14] and can be expressed by following
formula,
H =
n∑
k=1
ake
−j2pifτk , (1)
where k is the index of the paths, ak and τk are the power
decay and time delay of the k-th path, respectively.
To make CSI more relevant with person body, we aim to
mitigate signals received from other paths. The bandwidth (B)
in WiPIN is 40MHz. Correspondingly, the time resolution is
∆t = 1/B = 25ns, which yields a distance resolution of
∆t = c/B = 7.5m, where c is the electromagnetic wave
speed in the air, approximately 3× 108m/s. In the settings of
this paper (see one example in Fig. 2 leftmost), major paths
reflected from person body are within 7.5m, indicating that
CSI from body paths should almost have the least time delays
(within 25ns). Thus, we first apply the inverse fast Fourier
transform (IFFT) one each sample of H , i.e., hf ∈ R1×30,
to convert hf to time domain (ht), keep the item in the least
time delay whereas suppress the subsequent items (divided by
a large number, i.e., 1000), then convert ht back to frequency
domain by fast Fourier transform (FFT). We apply IFFT &
FFT operations on every sample of H , greatly mitigating
multi-path effect on CSI and making CSI much more relevant
to human body.
B. Feature Extraction
We retain CSI in all subcarriers since the absorption and
reflection at different frequencies are necessarily to be involved
in the ultimate features. Specifically, CSI at all subcarriers
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Fig. 5. Partial multipath effect mitigation. Left: in CSI time domain, we keep
the item with the least time delay (red box), and suppress (dividing by 1000)
remaining items (blue box). Right: then we covert CSI time domain back
to frequency domain. Above operations largely mitigate CSI compositions
reflected from other paths, and focus on person body.
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Fig. 6. Threshold learning process. We learn the identification threshold
from the distribution of prediction scores. Then, those the maximal prediction
score exceeding the threshold are considered as authenticated users. Once
authenticated, index of maximal prediction score is the user ID prediction.
implies Wi-Fi signals present selective decline at different
frequencies [15] over unique person body. After mitigating the
impact of multi-path effect, we average CSI time series for 30
distinct features. Besides them, we leverage another 9 features
to depict CSI frequency domain profile, one profile example
shown in Fig. 5 (Right). The features are the (1) mean, (2)
standard deviation, (3) median absolute deviation, (4) the
mean absolute deviation, (5) interquartile range, (6) root mean
square, (7) skewness, (8) kurtosis, and (9) entropy. The first 8
statistics values are common in time series mining [16], [17],
thus we only explain the entropy we proposed in WiPIN.
The entropy is used to describe the discrete degree of the
CSI profile. Assume that the maximum and minimum values
of CSI are M and m, respectively. To calculate the entropy,
we equally divide [m, M] into 10 bins, and count the number
of CSI that fall in the i-th bin, i.e., ni. Then we take ni30 as the
probability that CSI falls in the i-th bin, donated as pi. The
entropy of CSI profile is computed via Equation. 2:
E = −
10∑
i=1
pi log pi. (2)
note that we define pi log pi = 0 if pi = 0.
After obtaining features, we segment collected CSI into
training set and test set (segmentation detail will be descried
in Section. IV). Because metrics of these 39 features are
not identical, we normalize them into [-1, +1] via following
equation,
x′i =
(2xi −max−min)
(max−min) , (3)
where max and min are the maximum and minimum of the
i-th features in the training set, respectively; xi is the i-th
feature of one training/test instance x, x′i is the corresponding
normalized feature.
C. Identity Matching
1) Classifier Training: Person ID classifiers are trained
to identify the user ID. Using training set, we train person
ID classifiers via a support vector machine (SVM) toolbox,
i.e., LIBLINEAR [18]. The classifiers are trained with the
L2-regularized, L2-loss, primal, radial base function (RBF)
kernel, and their default hyper-parameters. Besides, we use
one-against-all training strategy, which learns N classifiers
if the volume of users is N . The N classifiers produce N
prediction scores on one instance. In this setting, the prediction
ID is the index of classifier that outputs the highest score,
formally as Equation. 4.
i = arg max
i∈{1,2,...,N}
yi. (4)
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Fig. 7. 100 examples of maximal normalized classifying scores. The value
of the 5th percentile point (red circle) as the rejecting threshold.
where yi is the score of classifiers on the i-th person.
2) Threshold Learning: According to Equation. 4, clas-
sifiers always make prediction from trained IDs (aka au-
thenticated IDs) even for illegal users, which makes WiPIN
vulnerable. Thus we propose threshold learning algorithm to
enable WiPIN to reject illegal users. Recall that N classifiers
produce N scores over trained users. With SoftMax function
below, we normalize these N scores into [0, 1].
y′i =
eyi∑N
i=1 e
yi
. (5)
where yi is the same as Equation. 4; y′i is the normalized
score. The normalized score can be interpreted as prediction
confidence, e.g., y′4 = 0.6 means that classifiers regard this
person as the 4th user with 60% confidence.
The threshold to identify illegal users is learned from the
distribution of normalized scores. More precisely, for one
training instance, we can compute its maximal normalized
prediction score, denoted as s. Then we have the maximal
prediction score set, S, computing from the whole training
set. After removing mis-classified instances, we take the 5th
percentile of these scores as the threshold. For example, we
plot 100 maximal scores of 100 training instances in Fig. 7.
The 5th percentile is 0.5278, thus in this situation WiPIN
regards a person as illegal user if her maximal normalized
prediction score is lower than 0.5278. Otherwise, trained
classifiers will output an ID prediction via Equation. 4.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We use two Mini-PCs with Intel 5300 wireless NICs as the
transmitter and receiver, respectively. The frequency is set at
5GHz and the packet transmission rate is set to 500Hz. As
illustrated in Fig. 2 (leftmost), the transmitter and receiver are
placed on two cartons of 1.2m high and 2.4m apart. We recruit
30 subjects for our experiments, in which subjects are required
to stand still at the mid-perpendicular of the Tx-Rx link.
A. Quantitative Results
For one subject, we record CSI time-serial data 30 times,
each data lasting five seconds. We randomly select 20 out of
30 for training classifiers and learning defending thresholds,
and the remaining 10 for the evaluation purpose. We perform
the above data collection and segmentation on all 30 subjects.
Fig. 8. Left. When user volume increases from 2 to 30, identification accuracy
gradually decreases from 100% to 92%. Right. Evaluation on Threshold
Learning Algorithm. We randomly select k (2 to 29) subjects as valid users to
learn thresholds, meanwhile the remaining 30-k (28 to 1) users attack WiPIN.
With more legal users and less attackers, balanced accuracy increases.
1) Performance of Identity Classifiers: We would like to
evaluate the accuracy of identity classifiers (ratio of correctly
identified in the test and the all test) with the user volume
increasing. In particular, to evaluate the user volume of k,
we randomly select k subjects as users, apply their training
data to train ID classifiers, and compute the test accuracy
with their test data. Moreover, we do above randomly user
selection, classifier training, and accuracy computing for 100
times. Thus for k, we have 100 accuracies, whose averages
and quartiles are plotted in Fig. 8 (left). With this approach,
we have an accuracy curve of ID classifiers. We see that
WiPIN works pretty well in relatively small user volume, and
gradually decreases to 92% when all subjects are considered
as users.
2) Performance of Threshold Learning: WiPIN can also
reject illegal users that not seen before via threshold learning
as described in Section. III-C. To test this, we select k
subjects as authenticated users to learn threshold, and apply
the threshold on all subjects, where k subjects are valid that
should be classified as legal users (true positive, TP), whereas
the remaining 30 − k users are illegal users that should be
correctly rejected (true negative, TN). We use the balanced
accuracy (BA = 0.5×TP-Rate + 0.5×TN-Rate) to evaluate the
performance of the threshold learning algorithm. As similar
scheme above, we compute BAs and quartiles of threshold
learning with the legal user volume increasing (illegal user vol-
ume decreasing), and show them in Fig. 8 (right). We see the
balanced accuracy increases from 0.87 (k=2) to 0.94 (k=29),
maintaining at a high level. In addition, we ascribe the the
increment of BA to that the learning algorithm gain more
knowledge in CSI of legal users to reject illegal attacks, i.e.,
higher TN-Rate, when trained with data that correspond to
increasing legal users (with k increasing).
B. Evaluation on Robustness
1) CSI Stability vs. Time: We recruit 10 subjects, record
CSI, and prepare data as in Section. IV-A over 15 consecutive
days. We apply 2 strategies to train ID classifiers to evaluate
the stability of WiPIN.
Strategy 1: using the CSI data of the first day as the training
set, and the data of other days as the test set. This strategy
simulates the scenario of no updates in WiPIN. Strategy 2:
using all CSI data in the first jth days as the training set, and
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Fig. 13. Three Apparel Categories.
the data after the jth day as the test set. This strategy simulates
the WiPIN-updating enabled scenario.
We plot results in Fig. 9. We find that when using Strategy
1 (blue line), the accuracy of WiPIN decreases gradually. This
result shows that time-varying does leave an impact on the
feature stability, decreasing to 90% after 10 days, implying
the necessity of updating users’ features. On the other hand,
if we update WiPIN (red line), it can keep high accuracy in
certain period. With above analysis, we suggest that a proper
updating period is about 10 days in this situation.
2) Impact of Apparel Changing: It is common that users
change their apparels. In this evaluation, we roughly divide
apparels into three categories, i.e., summer apparels (e.g., T-
shirt), autumn/spring apparels (e.g., windbreaker), and winter
apparels (e.g., down jacket). We recruit 10 subjects and ask
them to wear three categories of apparels, shown in Fig. 13.
When one wears one clothes, we record corresponding CSI 15
times, where 10 out of 15 for training, the remaining 5 for test.
Other settings in evaluation keep the same as in Section. IV-A.
We perform 10 cases of evaluation process.
Case 1-3. We alternately select CSI data collected when
subjects wear one category of apparels as the training set, train
WiPIN, and evaluate it via the data of all three categories. We
call this One for All.
Case 4-6. We select the data of two categories of apparels
as the training set, train WiPIN, and and evaluate it via the
data of all categories. We call this Two for All.
Case 7. We select all training data, train WiPIN, and
evaluate it via all test set. We call this All for All.
Case 8-10. We select the data of one category of apparels as
the training set, train WiPIN, and predict by using the selected
category of apparels as the test set. We call this One for itself.
We plot the average classification accuracy for each case in
Fig. 10. The first six bars indicate that apparel changing to
different categories has certain impacts on WiPIN. However,
WiPIN can achieve at least 77% accuracy when only utilizing
one category apparel as the training set. On the other hand,
bars of 7-10 in Fig. 10 demonstrate that WiPIN achieves an
average accuracy of 94% if the apparel category keep the
same during training and testing. Above results mean that
within a certain period, e.g., in summer or in wither, in which
people generally do not change their apparels drastically, high
performance can be guaranteed.
3) Impact of Environment Noise: We choose five different
places in our office building, including the places at an
empty laboratory #1, a crowded laboratory #2, a crowded
seminar room, a empty meeting room, and a narrow corridor,
respectively. All these places are diverse in terms of surround-
ings, i.e., environment noise. We involve 10 subjects in this
experiment. At each place, we collect 15 CSI series for every
subjects, in which 10 are used as training data and the left as
test data. Other settings keep the same as in Section. IV-A.
The results are shown in Fig. 11.
We see that the average accuracy is about 94%. Specifically,
in the seminar room and corridor, WiPIN does not work as well
as in laboratory #1 and the meeting room. This is because
the multi-path effect is much more stronger in the former
places, making CSI components more complex and reducing
the component weight that reflected from human body.
C. Computation Overhead
We do computation overhead evaluation using data collected
in Section. IV-A. We adjust the sampling time from 0 to
start standing preprocessing extracting mapping
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5 seconds to determine the CSI sampling requirement (user
standing overhead) for a good identity matching performance.
Fig. 12 shows the results, where we see WiPIN can achieve
92% mean accuracy while the time that user stands is more
than 200ms.
Besides the user standing overhead, overhead in signal pre-
processing, feature extraction, and identity mapping, comprise
computation time cost of WiPIN. According to Fig. 12, we
use CSI samples that collected in 200ms to calculate the
overhead. The computation is done in a desktop PC (with a
CPU mode 2.7 GHz Intel Core i5, memory of 8GB DDR3) via
Matlab R2015b. The cumulative computation overhead plus
user standing overhead are shown in Fig. 14. indicating that
WiPIN requires about 230ms to identify a person, which is
greatly time efficient. The low overhead proves that WiPIN is
applicable to real-time person identification applications.
D. Comparison with Prior Work
We compare WiPIN with three previous work, Wi-Who
[2], WiFi-ID [3], and FreeSense [1], in Fig. 15. As Fig. 15
shows, WiPIN greatly outperforms those three approaches in
terms of accuracy. In addition, these works are all operation-
based approaches, requiring the user to walk 2m-6m, which
is inconvenient and raises barriers for real-world applications.
V. RELATED WORK
Passive person identification that mainly utilizes person
behavior patterns, such as when typing [19], [20] and breath-
ing [21], has proven popular. It is hard to fool these system
because the attack needs extremely vivid imitation on user
behaviors. Among past work, applying Wi-Fi signals to detect
person walking pattern (aka gait) is one leading schema in
wireless security and privacy community, such as WiFiU [4],
WiWho [2], WiFi-ID [3], etc. In gait-based work, to get
authenticated, users must walk along the pre-defined path
several meters, which is labor intensive and time-consuming,
thus making it unpractical for use. In addition, an attacker can
record a video when users walking, then practice to walk with
a similar gait as the users to be a fake.
Compared to gait-based work, WiPIN requires user to do
no operation, but to stand for more than 200ms, which is
user-friendly, time efficient, and meets requirements of real-
time use scenarios. Moreover, WiPIN captures whole body
information that is with high resilient to attacks.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose WiPIN, an operation-free person
identification system using Wi-Fi signals. Compared to pre-
vious work, it is much more user-friendly, time efficient, and
robuster. To achieve WiPIN, we carefully design algorithms
in signal processing, feature extraction, and identify matching.
Besides, we prototype WiPIN in commdity off-the-shelf Wi-
Fi devices and extensively evaluate WiPIN in a group of
30 subjects from various aspects. Experimental results show
that WiPIN achieves competitive performance in identifying
authenticated users as well as rejecting illegal users.
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